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The modulation of conditional assertions and its effects
on reasoning
Ana Cristina Quelhas
Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada, Lisbon, Portugal
Philip N. Johnson-Laird
Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
Csongor Juhos
Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada, Lisbon, Portugal
The theory of mental models postulates that conditionals of the sort, if A then C, have a “core”
meaning referring to three possibilities: A and C, not-A and C, and not-A and not-C. The meaning
of a conditional’s clauses and general knowledge can modulate this meaning, blocking certain possi-
bilities or adding relations between the clauses. Four experiments investigated such interpretations in
factual and deontic domains. In Experiment 1, the participants constructed instances of what was
possible and what was impossible according to various conditionals. The results corroborated the
general predictions of the model theory and also the occurrence of modulation. The resulting
interpretations governed the conclusions that participants accepted in Experiment 2, which also
yielded the predicted effects of a time limit on responding. In Experiment 3, the participants drew
the predicted conclusions for themselves. In Experiment 4, modulation led to predicted temporal
relations between A and C. We relate these results to current theories of conditionals.
Keywords: Reasoning; Conditionals; Mental models; Modulation; Formal rules of inference.
Reasoning from assertions based on “if” is ubi-
quitous in daily life. We all make such infer-
ences as:
If we don’t want to miss the plane then we must leave in five
minutes.
We don’t want to miss the plane.
And so we must leave in five minutes.
Inferences based on conditional assertions have
also been much studied in the psychological
laboratory, but experimenters have tended to use
abstract or artificial materials, such as:
If there is a “B” then there is a “2”.
There is a “B”.
And so there is a “2”.
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The reason for avoiding realistic materials is to
protect the underlying mental processes from the
effects of content and knowledge (see, e.g., Evans
& Over, 2004; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991;
Rips, 1994; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972).
Indeed, everyday conditionals do have a variety of
meanings. They have been a theoretical nightmare
for two millennia, and so there are more books
about “if” than about any other two-lettered word.
The theory of mental models—the “model
theory” for short—applies to conditionals, and it
explains the diversity of their meanings in terms
of interactions among a set of simple components
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). It gives an
account of their core meaning and of a mechanism
of modulation that can transform this meaning into
an indefinite number of different sorts of
interpretation. Certain sorts of modulation
should have a powerful impact on the inferences
that individuals draw, and the present paper
reports a series of studies that investigated this
hypothesis. The paper begins with an outline of
the model theory and of other alternative accounts
of conditionals. It then reports four experiments
that test the modulation hypothesis. Finally, it
draws some general conclusions about theories of
conditionals.
The model theory of conditionals
Validity is easily defined in logic: “A valid infer-
ence is one whose conclusion is true in every case
in which all its premises are true” (Jeffrey, 1981,
p. 1). Psychological theories based on formal
rules of inference aim to capture validity by way
of logical form (e.g., Rips, 1994). That goal is
simple to achieve in logic, because logic deals
with the implications of sentences in a formal
language, and so logical form is transparent and
unambiguous. However, the goal is difficult to
achieve in everyday life, because validity concerns
propositions expressed by sentences, not sentences
themselves. And the proposition expressed by sen-
tences, such as, “If you do that then I’ll do this,”
clearly depends on its context (Jeffrey, 1981,
p. 14). Hence, logical form depends on both the
grammatical form of a sentence and the context
of its use. No algorithm exists for recovering the
logical form of all the propositions expressible in
a natural language. And some logicians confronted
with natural language have found logical form uni-
lluminating (e.g., Barwise, 1989).
The model theory makes the radical assumption
that reasoning depends, not on logical form, but on
mental models, which are psychological analogues
of the models that represent content in logic.
According to the theory, individuals use the
meaning of words, the grammatical structure of sen-
tences, and their knowledge, to construct models of
the possibilities to which propositions refer, and a
conclusion is valid if it holds in all these models
(e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2006). Hence, validity can be
assessed for individual inferences. The theory
applies to conditionals (Johnson-Laird & Byrne,
2002; Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Girotto, 2008),
and it postulates that their complexity arises from
interactions among several simple components:
1. Basic conditionals are those that are as inde-
pendent as possible from knowledge and have
no semantic or referential relations between
their clauses other than their co-occurrence in
the same conditional. The core meaning of a
basic conditional, such as:
If there is a triangle then there is a circle.
refers to three possibilities:
D o
not-D o
not-D not-o
The conditional can accordingly be paraphrased as:
There isn’t a triangle, or, if there is, then there’s a circle.
The three possibilities of the core meaning
correspond to those of “material implication”, a
connective in logic (Jeffrey, 1981, p. 61). Children
gradually develop the ability to list these possibili-
ties (Barrouillet, Grosset, & Lecas, 2000;
Barrouillet & Lecas, 1998, 1999). Young children
tend to list just the first possibility above; older
children list the first and the third possibilities;
and still older children list all three possibilities. A
better predictor of the number of possibilities that
children list is not their age, but the processing
capacity of their working memory.
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2. The principle of truth stipulates that individ-
uals focus on what is true at the expense of
what is false, especially for subordinate clauses
(Johnson-Laird, 2006; Johnson-Laird &
Savary, 1999). Hence, when individuals
reason from a basic conditional, they normally
construct a single mental model that represents
the first possibility above, in which the condi-
tional’s antecedent (the if-clause) and its conse-
quent (the then-clause) are both true, and an
implicit mental model—a place holder with
no explicit content (as shown by the ellipsis
below)—that represents the other possibilities
in which the antecedent is false:
D o
. . .
3. In daily life, the meaning of the clauses in con-
ditionals and coreferential relations between
them can modulate the core meaning in a
process of semantic modulation. Likewise,
knowledge about the context and the topic of
the conditional can modulate the core
meaning in a process of pragmatic modulation.
The effects of the two sorts of modulation are
similar. One effect is to block the construction
of models of possibilities. For instance, the con-
ditional, “if they played a game then they didn’t
play soccer”, does not refer to three possibilities,
because the meaning of “soccer” prevents refer-
ence to the possibility in which they didn’t play
a game yet they did play soccer. It follows from
the truth of the conditional alone that they
didn’t play soccer. Another effect of modulation
is to add information about a relation between
the events referred to in the antecedent and
consequent. The conditional, “if she put a
book on the shelf then it fell off”, elicits the
temporal relation that the antecedent event
occurred before the consequent event, and the
spatial relation that the book ended up below
the shelf (cf. Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989;
and Schaeken, Johnson-Laird, & d’Ydewalle,
1996). There are indefinitely many interpret-
ations of conditionals because there are indefi-
nitely many temporal, spatial, or other
relations that modulation may yield.
4. The interpretation of conditionals depends on
their grammatical form, tense, mood, aspect,
and modal auxiliaries. Certain conditionals
are deontic in that they concern what is per-
missible or obligatory, or, as we shall say,
what is deontically possible or necessary. One
clue to them is the use of certain modal auxili-
ary verbs, such as ought in this sentence: “If you
promised then you ought to go”, but context
matters too (Stenning & Van Lambalgen,
2008, p. 50). The model theory postulates
that such assertions are represented in terms
of factual possibilities for their antecedents
and deontic possibilities for their consequents:
You promised. You go.
You didn’t promise. You go.
You didn’t promise. You don’t go.
The case in which you promised and didn’t go is
factually possible because people do break prom-
ises, but it is not deontically possible—that is, it
is not permissible for you not to go. Once again,
individuals are unlikely to represent all three possi-
bilities above. However, in the domain of pruden-
tial obligations, such as, “If the nurse cleans up the
blood then she should wear rubber gloves”
(Manktelow & Over, 1990), they are likely to rep-
resent the salient deontic possibility that the nurse
cleaned up blood and wore gloves and the deontic
impossibility that she cleaned up blood and did not
wear gloves (Byrne, 2005; Quelhas & Byrne,
2003). In other words, individuals are more aware
of deontic impossibilities than of factual impossi-
bilities (Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 2005).
5. Another effect of auxiliary verbs is to yield con-
ditional sentences that are subjunctive in mood,
e.g.: “If there had been any deserters then they
would have been shot”. This conditional can
express a proposition that leaves open
whether or not there were any deserters.
However, it can also express a counterfactual
claim according to which there weren’t any
deserters, but had there been any, they would
have been shot (see Byrne, 2005, for a theory
of counterfactuals and corroboratory evidence).
6. In logic, material implication is closest to the
core meaning of a conditional, but material
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implication has a “truth-functional” meaning.
That is, whether it is true or false depends
solely on whether its constituent clauses are
true or false: It is false in the case that its ante-
cedent is true, and its consequent is false; and it
is true in any other case. Such an interpretation
cannot work for all conditionals, because of the
effects of modulation. For example, a con-
ditional such as: “If she fell off her bike then
she broke her leg”, is not necessarily true
merely because both of its clauses are true:
The two events may have occurred in the
wrong temporal order. Indeed, the interpretive
process takes into account the meaning and
reference of clauses even in those cases in
which it results in a core interpretation corre-
sponding to material implication. A corollary
is that “conditionals are not truth functional”
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, p. 673; pace
Evans & Over, 2004, p. 21; Evans, Over, &
Handley, 2005).
7. A small-scope principle applies to any sentential
operator, including negation, and phrases such
as “it is true that”: These operators tend to be
interpreted, sometimes wrongly, as applying
only to main clauses (Johnson-Laird et al.,
2008). We emphasize that “scope” here refers
to the grammatical form of sentences, not to
the logical form of propositions. According to
the small-scope principle, the following
question:
In what cases is it true that if there is a triangle then there is
a circle?
will often be taken to mean:
If there is a triangle then in what cases is it true that there is
a circle?
Hence, in Quine’s (1974, p. 19) words: “An affir-
mation of the form ‘if p then q’ is commonly felt
less as an affirmation of a conditional than as a
conditional affirmation of the consequent. . . . If
the antecedent turns out to be false, our con-
ditional affirmation is as if it had never been
made.” Quine accordingly distinguishes between
the affirmation of a conditional and how individ-
uals often interpret conditionals.
Alternative theories of conditionals
The most important alternative theories are those
based on formal rules of inference, on necessary
and sufficient conditions, on suppositions, and
on probabilities. We outline each of them in turn.
Formal rule theories postulate rules of inference
for reasoning from conditional premises (e.g.,
Braine & O’Brien, 1991). The rule of conditional
proof, for example, allows a reasoner to assume a
proposition, A, for the sake of argument, and
should that assumption together with other pre-
mises lead to a conclusion, C, then the reasoner
can draw a conditional conclusion, if A then C.
Similarly, a conditional premise, if A then C,
together with a categorical premise, A, allows a
reasoner to conclude, C, which is an inference of
the sort known as modus ponens. Formal theorists
recognize that conditionals can be interpreted in
different ways (see, e.g., Braine & O’Brien,
1991), but they have not proposed any compre-
hensive theory of how such interpretations arise.
Rips (1994), for example, finesses this problem,
taking for granted that the input to his
“PSYCOP” theory is the logical form of premises.
In contrast, Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2008)
argue that conditionals have various logical
forms, including one that captures a ternary
relation of the form: If A and nothing abnormal is
the case then C (see also, e.g., Reiter, 1980).
Experimenters have indeed observed the effects
of abnormal conditions on conditional inferences.
A disabling condition for the proposition, “if you
pull the trigger then the pistol fires”, is that there
are no bullets in the pistol. When such a disabler
is salient, then individuals are less likely to make
modus ponens (see, e.g., Bonnefon & Hilton,
2002; Byrne, 1989a, 1989b; De Neys, Schaeken,
& d’Ydewalle, 2002). An alternative antecedent
for the proposition, “if you catch fish then you
have a fish supper” is that you buy fish from a
shop. When such an alternative is salient, then
individuals are less likely to infer fallaciously that
if you didn’t catch fish then you didn’t have a
fish supper (see, e.g., Byrne, 1989a, 1989b;
Cummins, 1995; Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, &
Rist, 1991; De Neys, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle,
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2005; Janveau-Brennan & Markovits, 1999;
Markovits & Vachon, 1990).
Another way to try to make sense of these
results is in terms of necessary and sufficient con-
ditions (Thompson, 1994, 2000). A disabling con-
dition establishes that an antecedent is no longer
sufficient for the consequent, and an alternative
to an antecedent establishes that an antecedent is
no longer necessary for the consequent. This
view is similar to certain aspects of the model
theory, and we are sympathetic to it. However,
the concepts of necessity and sufficiency are prob-
ably too technical to be psychological givens, and
they yield only four possible interpretations of a
conditional (see Table 1):
1. A is necessary and sufficient for C: the bicondi-
tional interpretation.
2. A is not necessary but sufficient for C: the core
interpretation.
3. A is necessary but not sufficient for C: the
enabling interpretation.
4. A is neither necessary nor sufficient for C: the
tautological interpretation.
As Table 1 shows, these interpretations can be
analysed in terms of models of possibilities. If A is
sufficient for C, then, in any possibility in which A
holds, C also holds. Likewise, if A is necessary for
C, then, in any possibility in which C holds, A also
holds—that is, C is sufficient for A. Indeed,
Markovits and his colleagues have developed a
model-based account of the phenomena (e.g.,
Markovits & Barrouillet, 2002; Markovits &
Quinn, 2002; Quinn & Markovits, 1998).
Modulation suggests that the blocking of possibili-
ties can yield 10 sorts of interpretation (see Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 2002), and so, for example, the
relevance interpretation of “if they played a game
then didn’t play soccer”, cannot be analysed in
terms of necessity and sufficiency (see Table 1).
The “suppositional” theory of Evans and Over
(e.g., 2004) is based in part on the model theory,
but it emphasizes an idea of the logician Ramsey
(1929/1990). He took the meaning of a con-
ditional to be material implication, but he wrote
(1929/1990, p. 155):
If two people are arguing “If p will q?” and both are in doubt as
to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowl-
edge and arguing on that basis about q; so that in a sense “If
p, q” and “If p, not q” are contradictories. We can say they
are fixing their degrees of belief in q given p. If p turns out to
be false, these degrees of belief are rendered void.
The Ramsey test offers no immediate expla-
nation of how individuals are able to envisage
the possibilities consistent with a basic conditional,
especially those possibilities in which the antece-
dent is false (e.g., Barrouillet et al., 2000).
However, following Stalnaker (1968), Evans and
Over (2004) suggest that the test could define
the meaning of conditionals. They also write:
“Our view of ‘if’ is that of a linguistic device the
purpose of which is to trigger a process of hypothe-
tical thinking and reasoning” (Evans & Over,
2004, p. 153). As they recognize, there are two
corollaries of their view. First, a conditional of
the form if A then C should have a defective
truth table—that is, it should be judged as true
when both A and C are true, false when A is
true, and C is false, but have no truth value when
Table 1. The possibilities compatible with five sorts of interpretation of conditionals of the grammatical form, if A then C
The five sorts of
interpretation of conditionals The possibilities consistent with each sort of conditional
Tautological A C A not-C not-A C not-A not-C
Core A C not-A C not-A not-C
Enabling A C A not-C not-A not-C
Biconditional A C not-A not-C
Relevance A C not-A C
Note: The cases in bold correspond to the explicit mental models of the propositions, which are constructed according to the principle
of truth.
1720 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2010, 63 (9)
QUELHAS, JOHNSON-LAIRD, JUHOS
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Jo
hn
so
n-
La
ir
d,
 P
. 
N.
] 
At
: 
20
:0
9 
16
 S
ep
te
mb
er
 2
01
0
A is false. Naı¨ve individuals often make such jud-
gements when they are asked to evaluate condi-
tionals (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Tagart, 1969).
Second, when individuals are asked for the denial
of a conditional, they should respond: if A then
not-C. Some evidence is consistent with this view
(Fillenbaum, 1978; Handley, Evans, &
Thompson, 2006). The small-scope principle,
described earlier, predicts this response, though it
is an incorrect negation of the core meaning of if
A then C. However, other evidence shows that
individuals quite often make the correct denial of
such conditionals: A and not-C (Khemlani,
Orenes, & Johnson-Laird, 2009).
The suppositional theory shares many com-
ponents with the model theory, which postulates
that individuals do make suppositions, though
often of propositions other than the antecedents
of conditionals (Van der Henst, Yang, &
Johnson-Laird, 2002). The two theories diverge
principally in their accounts of conditionals. And
if it is correct both that conditionals have a defec-
tive truth table and that their correct negations
negate only their consequents then the model
theory’s account is wrong. However, another con-
sequence of the model theory’s small-scope prin-
ciple is that individuals should treat the
verification of conditionals as a task in which
they take the antecedent for granted and assess
the truth of the consequent alone. The result is a
defective truth table in which if A then C has no
truth value in any case in which A is false (see
Evans & Over, 2004; Johnson-Laird & Tagart,
1969). Of course, they are not really evaluating
the truth of the conditional, but rather the truth
of its consequent given the truth of its antecedent.
These issues, however, are highly controversial and
not immediately relevant to our present studies
(see, e.g., Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2009; Over,
Evans, & Elqayam, 2010, for contrasting views).
Various accounts of human reasoning have pos-
tulated a crucial role for probabilistic consider-
ations. Some theorists have proposed that a
probabilistic relation between premises and con-
clusions should replace the notion of validity
(Oaksford & Chater, 2001). Other theorists have
maintained the notion of validity, but postulated
a probabilistic semantics for conditionals: “In
everyday contexts it seems to be more plausible
to interpret conditionals not by material impli-
cations, but by much weaker conditional probabil-
ities” (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2005). Likewise, many
theorists have proposed that the probability of a
conditional is the corresponding conditional prob-
ability of its consequent given its antecedent (e.g.,
Evans, Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2007; Evans,
Handley, & Over, 2003; Hadjichristidis et al.,
2001; Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley, &
Sloman, 2007; Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003).
Oberauer and his colleagues have argued that
the model theory needs to be revised in order to
explain their participants’ judgements of the
probabilities of conditionals, which usually corro-
borated the conditional probability hypothesis
(Oberauer, Geiger, Fischer, & Weidenfeld,
2007). However, according to the model theory,
these judgements reflect the small-scope prin-
ciple—that is, individuals take a question of the
form:
What is the probability of if A then C?
to mean:
If A, then what is the probability of C?
Experimental participants spontaneously make
this change when they think aloud (Girotto &
Johnson-Laird, 2004). Serious arguments exist
against the conditional probability hypothesis
(see, e.g., Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2009;
Schroyens, Schaeken, & Dieussaert, 2008). The
issue is controversial, but not relevant to our
present experiments, which do not concern prob-
abilities, and so we pursue it no further here.
We have outlined five accounts of conditionals:
the model theory, formal rule theories, the theory
of necessary and sufficient conditions, the supposi-
tional theory, and probabilistic theories. So, how
do they fare in accounting for reasoning and the
four standard inferences based on conditionals?
Two of these inferences are affirmative:
Modus ponens (MP): If A then C; A; therefore, C.
Affirmation of the consequent (AC):
If A then C; C; therefore, A.
and two of them are negative inferences:
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Modus tollens (MT): If A then C; not-C; therefore, not-A.
Denial of the antecedent (DA): If A then C; not-A; there-
fore, not-C.
In the case of the core meaning of conditionals,
only modus ponens and modus tollens are valid.
Oberauer (2006) has compared parameterized
models of three of the theories with his data for
these four inferences. The best accounts were
given by two versions of the model theory, one
modified by the introduction of a directional
effect from antecedent to consequent and the
other a “dual-process” version of the model
theory due to Verschueren, Schaeken, and
d’Ydewalle (2005) and based in part on Johnson-
Laird (1983, chap. 6), who defends a dual-
process theory. They gave a better account of the
data than either the suppositional theory (Evans
& Over, 2004) or the probabilistic theory
(Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000).
The present studies concern modulation, and
their logic is as follows: First, no existing theory
of conditionals provides a recipe for predicting
the actual interpretation of particular conditionals.
Such a prediction would depend on a comprehen-
sive theory of semantics and pragmatics, which is
beyond any immediately foreseeable theory.
However, the model theory does predict a set of
possible interpretations, including those that go
beyond necessary and sufficient conditions and
beyond other theories of conditionals. Second,
we used our intuitions to select conditionals that
should yield different predicted interpretations,
but we carried out Experiment 1 in order to deter-
mine the actual interpretations of these condi-
tionals: The participants had to construct the
different possibilities, consistent and inconsistent
with the conditionals. No direct path exists to
the interpretations of assertions, but this task is
simple, reveals a key aspect of interpretations,
and yields a clear consensus (Barrouillet et al.,
2000). The experiment was accordingly designed
to determine operationally the main interpret-
ations of a set of conditionals. Third, these
interpretations should predict different patterns
of acceptance and rejection of the four standard
conditional inferences, and Experiments 2 and 3
were designed to test this prediction. Finally, a
further experiment examined whether modulation
introduced temporal relations into the interpret-
ation of conditionals, because no previous study
had examined this possibility, and because it
would be a corrective to the misconception that
the model theory proposes a truth-functional
analysis of conditionals.
EXPERIMENT 1
Our first experiment examined whether the
content of conditionals modulated their interpret-
ation. We presented participants with conditionals
of the grammatical form, If A then C, and their task
was to construct the cases that were possible and
the cases that were impossible according to each
conditional. They constructed these cases using
cards corresponding to the individual propositions
A, C, not-A, and not-C. We created conditionals
that intuitively should yield different sorts of
interpretation (according to Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 2002). These interpretations, if they
occurred, yield contrasting predictions about
which valid inferences individuals should draw.
There were two sets of conditionals, one set con-
cerned factual matters, and one set concerned
deontic matters. Table 1 lists the possibilities cor-
responding to the five interpretations we sought to
elicit in our entire set of experiments.
Whatever interpretations the participants
make, the model theory yields four general predic-
tions about their performance. First, they should
construct a greater proportion of possible cases
than impossible cases, because mental models rep-
resent only possibilities. Second, this difference
should be greater for factual conditionals than
for deontic conditionals, because in the everyday
world of permissions and obligations what is for-
bidden is more salient than what is factually
impossible (see Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird,
2005; Byrne, 2005, p. 78; Quelhas & Byrne,
2003). Third, participants should construct the A
and C case first for all interpretations, because
this case corresponds to the one explicit mental
model of all conditionals in which both clauses
are true. Fourth, if modulation has an effect, it
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should become apparent in the cases that the
participants constructed second (see Table 1).
Method
Design
The participants were assigned at random either to
a group that received factual conditionals or to a
group that received deontic conditionals. Within
each group, the participants constructed cases for
each of 16 conditionals with different contents
(four instances of each of these putative interpret-
ations: core, biconditional, enabling, and tautolo-
gical). The order of the conditionals was
randomly assigned to each participant.
Participants
A total of 60 first-year psychology students (48
woman, 12 men) from Instituto Superior de
Psicologia Aplicada (ISPA) in Lisbon participated
in the experiment for course credit (factual group:
n ¼ 30; deontic group: n ¼ 30).
Materials
The materials were 16 factual and 16 deontic con-
ditionals. For both sets, we constructed four
instances of each of the four sorts of interpretation
identified in Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002).
The full set of materials for this experiment is in
Appendix A. Here are four factual examples
(translated, as are all the materials in this paper,
from Portuguese):
Core interpretation: If the dish is kidney beans then its basis is
beans.
Biconditional interpretation: If the animal is a lion then the
female is a lioness.
Enabling interpretation: If the dish is made of meat then it
can be Portuguese stew.
Tautological interpretation: If the dessert is made of apple
then it can be pie.
The deontic contents were similar—for example,
an example of the core interpretation is:
If a person gets his driving licence then he or she must be at least
18 years old.
The participants constructed the instances from
four sorts of cards representing an affirmation of
the antecedent of the conditional, a negation of
its antecedent, an affirmation of its consequent,
and a negation of its consequent.
Procedure
The participants were tested individually in a quiet
room. The key instructions were as follows: “In this
experiment, we are interested in how people
imagine different situations based on conditional
sentences. I will show you sentences that you will
read out aloud. Next I will give you sets of four
cards, and your task will be to construct all the situ-
ations that come to mind after reading the initial
sentence. Construct the situations in the same
order as you imagine them.” The instructions
explained that the task was to use the cards provided
for each conditional to construct cases, both those
that were possible and those that were impossible,
factually or deontically, depending on the group.
The participants were told that they were free to
construct the cases in whatever order they came to
mind, but they had to indicate the status of each
case as possible or impossible. As an example, the
experimenter showed the participants a disjunctive
assertion and constructed an example of a situation
that was possible given the assertion, and another
that was impossible, either factually or deontically,
again depending on the group.
Results and discussion
The results corroborated the model theory’s four
general predictions. First, of the cases constructed
by the factual group, 97% were possibilities, and
only 3% were impossibilities. Likewise, of those
constructed by the deontic group, 82% were possi-
bilities, and 18% were impossibilities. The overall
proportions according to the four interpretations
in Table 1 should have been 75% to 25%.
Hence, the participants omitted a greater pro-
portion of impossibilities than possibilities: All
30 participants in the factual group had this bias
(binomial test, p ¼ .530); and 28 out of the 30 par-
ticipants in the deontic group had this bias (bino-
mial test, p , .0001). Individuals focus more on
what is possible than on what is impossible.
Second, as the percentages above show, this
bias to focus on what is possible was greater for
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factual conditionals than for deontic conditionals,
and the difference between the two groups was
reliable (Mann–Whitney test, z ¼ 5.417, p ,
.00001). Hence, individuals are more concerned
about what is impermissible according to deontic
conditionals than about what is impossible accord-
ing to factual conditionals.
Third, the participants had an overwhelming
bias to construct first the case corresponding to
the explicit mental model in which both the ante-
cedent and the consequent of a conditional were
true. This bias occurred for all four putative sorts
of conditional in both the factual and deontic
groups, and the percentages ranged from 72% to
90%, and in each case more participants showed
this bias than would be expected by chance (bino-
mial tests, p , .0001, for all cases).
Fourth, the effects of modulation were apparent
in the cases that the participants constructed
second. Table 2 presents these percentages. As it
shows, the participants’ second cases tended to be
not-A and not-C as possible for the core and bicon-
ditional interpretations, but A and not-C as possible
for the enabling and tautological interpretations.
All 30 of the participants in the factual group had
this bias (binomial test, p ¼ .530), and 28 out of
the 30 participants in the deontic group had this
bias, 1 participant went against it, and 1 was a tie
(binomial test, p , .0001). These results show
that the conditionals did yield distinct interpret-
ations that should affect reasoning.
EXPERIMENT 2
The interpretations corroborated in Experiment 1
should elicit different patterns of inference. For
example, modus ponens follows from the core
and biconditional interpretations, but not from
the enabling interpretation, whereas denial of the
antecedent has the opposite pattern of validity.
Table 3 summarizes the valid conclusions for the
different interpretations of conditionals. The first
aim of the present experiment was to test
whether the predicted patterns of inference did
occur. The second aim was to test a prediction
about time pressure. Previous studies have exam-
ined its effects on various sorts of reasoning. It
led to an increased matching bias in Wason’s selec-
tion task—that is, the selection of those cards in
the one explicit mental model of the conditional
(Roberts & Newton, 2001)—to more errors in syl-
logistic reasoning (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005)
and conditional reasoning (Schroyens, Schaeken,
& Handley, 2003), and to less sensitivity to poten-
tial counterexamples in inferences from causal
conditionals (Verschueren et al., 2005). If individ-
uals have only a limited time to evaluate a con-
ditional inference, they should focus on the
mental models of the conditional (see the items
in bold in Table 1). The consequence should be
that they should tend to make the valid affirmative
inferences, which depend only on mental models,
but fail to make the valid negative inferences,
Table 2. The percentages of each of the four possibilities that the two groups in Experiment 1 constructed
second—that is, typically after they had constructed A and C
The four sorts of conditional
The four possibilities that the participants constructed
A and C
A and
not-C
not-A
and C
not-A and
not-C
Tautological 12 13 67 50 7 24 14 13
Core 9 9 5 8 38 30 43 40
Enabling 9 15 66 39 2 3 23 39
Biconditional 12 15 5 2 2 1 78 49
Note: The left-hand column in the cells presents the percentages for the factual group, and the
right-hand column presents the percentages for the deontic group. The balance of percentages
in a row are impossible cases that the participants constructed second.
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which depend on possibilities that are not expli-
citly represented in the mental models of the
conditionals.
Method
Design
The participants were randomly assigned to one of
four groups, depending on whether they evaluated
inferences from factual or from deontic condi-
tionals, and on whether they had an unlimited or
limited time to carry out each evaluation. Each
participant carried out 64 inferences based on
four instances of each of four sorts of conditional
premise (tautological, core, enabling, and bicondi-
tional) in the four standard conditional inferences:
modus ponens, affirmation of the consequent,
modus tollens, and denial of the antecedent.
Materials and procedure
The participants were tested in small groups, using
computers running the E-prime program. They
were told to imagine that they were graduate stu-
dents from the National Security Academy that
teaches secret service agents and that they were
taking part in a test of reasoning. They were
instructed to read the conditional premises,
which were presented on the first screen, to press
the space bar in order to read the second premise
(the categorical assertion) and the putative con-
clusion, and then to evaluate whether the con-
clusion was “correct”, “incorrect”, or “may or may
not be correct”, by pressing the appropriate
colour-coded key.
In the limited time groups, the computer
program curtailed the presentation of the pro-
blems. The time limit was equal to the mean
latency to evaluate modus ponens in a pretest
minus one standard deviation (2,368 ms for the
factual group, and 2,626 ms for the deontic
group). The participants in the unlimited time
groups had no time limit in which to make their
evaluations.
Participants
A total of 68 first-year psychology students (58
woman, 10 men) from ISPA in Lisbon partici-
pated in the experiment for course credit. They
were randomly assigned to one of the four
groups (factual unlimited time, n ¼ 18; factual
limited time, n ¼ 19; deontic unlimited time,
n ¼ 15; deontic limited time, n ¼ 16).
Results and discussion
Table 4 shows the percentages of inferences
endorsed in the two groups evaluating factual
inferences, and Table 5 shows the percentages
for the two groups evaluating deontic inferences.
Both tables show that the participants tended to
endorse valid inferences for the particular
interpretation of the conditionals and not to
endorse the invalid inferences for these interpret-
ations. This pattern was reliable in all four
groups. The numbers of participants who made
more predicted than unpredicted responses
according to modulation were as follows:
Table 3. The patterns of valid inferences for five sorts of interpretation of a conditional of the grammatical form, if A then C
The five sorts of
interpretation of conditionals
The four sorts of inference depending on the categorical premise
Modus ponens:
A
Affirmation of the
consequent: C
Modus tollens:
not-C
Denial of the
antecedent: not-A
Tautological
Core [ C [ not-A
Enabling [ A [ not-C
Biconditional [ C [ A [ not-A [ not-C
Relevance [ C
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Unlimited time factual group: 17 out of 18 with one tie
(binomial test, p , .517).
Unlimited time deontic group: 15 out of 15 (binomial test,
p ¼ .515).
Limited time factual group: 16 out of 19 with three ties
(binomial test, p , .516).
Limited time deontic group: 15 out of 16 and 1 contrary to
predictions (binomial test, p , .001).
The second salient result in the two tables is the
effect of time pressure. The participants in the
time pressure groups tended to endorse fewer
valid inferences than those in the unlimited time
groups (63% vs. 84%; Mann–Whitney, z ¼ 4.521
p , .0001). Similarly, those in the time pressure
groups tended to endorse more invalid inferences
than those in the unlimited groups (29% vs. 20%;
Mann–Whitney, z ¼ 2.429, p , .015).
The third and most important effect, as the
theory predicted, was the differential effect of
time pressure on inferences. For the factual
groups (see Table 4), the decline in correct affir-
mative inferences (modus ponens or affirmation
of the consequent) from unlimited to limited
time was only 18%, whereas the decline in
correct negative inferences (modus tollens or
denial of the antecedent) was 37%, and this inter-
action was reliable (Mann–Whitney test, z ¼
2.78, p , .005). In contrast, for the deontic
groups (see Table 5), the theory predicts less of
an effect because of the availability of prohibited
cases, and the interaction was not significant (a
16% decline for affirmative inferences and only a
14% decline for negative inferences, Mann–
Whitney test, z ¼ 0.11, p , .9).
In sum, the results bore out the pattern of infer-
ences predicted from the modulated interpret-
ations of the conditionals in Experiment 1. One
potential criticism of the experiment is that the
enabling and tautological conditionals contained
a modal auxiliary verb in their consequents, but
the conclusions did not—for example:
If the dish is made of codfish then it can be codfish “Braz”
style.
Table 5. The percentages of inferences endorsed as valid for deontic inferences in Experiment 2
The four sorts of
conditional
The four sorts of inference
Modus ponens
Affirmation of the
consequent Modus tollens
Denial of the
antecedent
Tautological 18 30 22 19 12 6 20 27
Core Valid 90 84 18 25 Valid 85 63 12 31
Enabling 15 34 Valid 98 66 12 27 Valid 83 63
Biconditional Valid 87 80 Valid 82 64 Valid 53 55 Valid 90 78
Note: The first percentage in each cell is for the unlimited time group, and the second percentage in each cell is from the limited time
group.
Table 4. The percentages of inferences endorsed as valid for factual inferences in Experiment 2
The four sorts
of conditional
The four sorts of inference
Modus ponens
Affirmation of the
consequent Modus tollens
Denial of the
antecedent
Tautological 25 37 38 37 4 13 11 17
Core Valid 99 86 38 61 Valid 75 30 35 33
Enabling 20 42 Valid 85 60 17 21 Valid 69 33
Biconditional Valid 96 86 Valid 94 76 Valid 78 43 Valid 86 50
Note: The first percentage in each cell is for the unlimited time group, and the second percentage in each cell is for the limited time
group.
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The dish is not made of codfish.
Therefore, it isn’t codfish “Braz” style.
However, the fact that most participants evaluated
the inference as correct corroborates the model
theory, which postulates that individuals use the
meaning of premises. However, it presents a diffi-
culty to existing psychological theories based on
formal rules of inference, which contain no rules
to explain such inferences. Another potential criti-
cism is that the participants evaluated conclusions
given to them, and so they may not have reasoned
at all, but merely guessed their responses or used
their general knowledge to guide them. The
problem with this explanation is that it fails to
explain the main interaction that occurred in the
experiment. Nevertheless, in order to obviate this
criticism, our next experiment called for the par-
ticipants to draw conclusions for themselves.
EXPERIMENT 3
In order to strengthen the case that modulation
affects reasoning, the participants in this experiment
drew their own conclusions. In the previous exper-
iment, they rightly tended not to accept any
inferences from tautological conditionals, and so
we replaced these conditionals with those that the
theory predicts should have a relevance interpret-
ation (see Table 1), and which accordingly should
yield modus ponens inferences alone (see Table 3).
We pretested the conditionals used in the present
experiment in a task in which a separate sample of
participants listed what was possible and what was
impossible for each conditional (as in Experiment
1). In general, the conditionals elicited the predicted
interpretations, with one exception: The conditional
predicted to elicit an enabling interpretation did so
on a minority of trials; otherwise, on 53% of trials,
it elicited the biconditional interpretation.
Method
Design
Participants wrote down their own conclusions on
80 trials based on 20 different conditionals that
occurred on separate trials with categorical premises
for the four sorts of inference: modus ponens, affir-
mation of the consequent, modus tollens, and denial
of the antecedent. The 20 conditionals consisted of
four different instances of conditionals with five
different interpretations according to the modu-
lation hypothesis: a core interpretation, a bicondi-
tional interpretation, an enabling interpretation,
and two sorts of relevance interpretation—one
with an affirmative consequent and one with a nega-
tive consequent. The 80 trials were presented in a
different random order to each participant.
Participants
A total of 28 students in the last year of high
school (20 women, 8 men) from a public school
in Lisbon participated in the experiment. Their
mean age was 17.5 years (SD ¼ 0.638).
Materials and procedure
The experiment was based on 20 conditionals con-
sisting of four instances of each of the five sorts of
predicted interpretation. Appendix B presents the
full set of materials, and here are examples:
Core: If the driver steps on the brake, then the car slows down.
Biconditional: If the key is the right one, then it opens the door.
Enabling: If the fishermen go out to the sea, then they catch
swordfish.
Relevance with affirmative consequent: If Ricardo wants to
go to Rossio, then there is a metro stop.
Relevance with negative consequent: If Joa˜o goes traveling,
then he doesn’t go by aeroplane.
As these examples illustrate, none of the condi-
tionals contained modal auxiliaries.
The participants carried out the experiment in a
single group in the classroom. Each of them received
a booklet containing 82 pages: 1 for each inference
plus 2 for instructions and examples. Their task
was to write down a conclusion, if any, that followed
correctly from each of the 80 sets of premises. If the
participants thought that nothing followed from the
premises, they wrote, “nothing follows”.
Results and discussion
The participants’ responses were classified into
two main categories: categorical conclusions, and
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other responses, principally “nothing follows”.
Categorical conclusions, depending on the par-
ticular sort of conditional were either as predicted
or contrary to prediction, and Table 6 presents the
percentages of categorical conclusions of both sorts
for the four conditional inferences based on the
different sorts of predicted interpretation. There
was no reliable difference in the responses to the
two sorts of relevance interpretation, and so we
have pooled the percentages for them.
Overall, the participants drew the predicted valid
conclusions, depending on the interpretation of the
conditionals, on 83% of the 40 relevant trials, and
responded correctly “nothing follows” on 72% of
the 40 relevant trials. All 28 participants made
more predicted responses than unpredicted
responses (Binomial test, p ¼ .528). These results
bore out the pattern of inferences predicted from
the modulated interpretations of the conditionals.
As Table 6 shows, the one major discrepancy in
the results was that the conditionals predicted to
have the enabling interpretation tended to elicit all
four sorts of inference, as though they had instead
the biconditional interpretation. The pretest of
these conditionals had indeed elicited this interpret-
ation on more than half the trials, probably because
they did not contain a modal auxiliary expressing the
mere possibility of their consequents.
EXPERIMENT 4
The previous experiments have shown that modu-
lation can block possibilities, giving rise to
different interpretations of conditionals that in
turn affect the inferences that individuals tend to
make. However, the model theory also predicts
that modulation can add information to models
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, p. 651). For
instance, appropriate contents should introduce a
temporal relation between antecedent and conse-
quent events—for example:
If Lisa received some money, then she paid Frederico.
Individuals know that payment can be made only if
a payer has money, and so modulation should yield
an interpretation of the conditional in which if
Lisa received some money then she did so before
she paid Frederico. The experiment aimed to test
whether individuals made such temporal infer-
ences, which have not hitherto been reported for
conditionals. It used pairs of conditionals and
questions about the temporal order of the events
to which they referred—for example:
If Lisa received the money, then she paid Frederico.
If she paid Frederico, then he bought a new laptop.
Lisa received the money.
Did Lisa receive the money before Frederico bought a new
laptop?
The experiment contrasted such forwards tem-
poral inferences with those in which the condi-
tionals conveyed a backwards temporal order in
which the antecedent event occurred after the con-
sequent event—for example:
If Tania gave Mauro a scooter, then he did well on the
exams.
If he did well on the exams, then he studied a lot.
Tania gave Mauro a scooter.
Did Tania gave Mauro a scooter after he studied a lot?
Table 6. The percentages of categorical conclusions that the participants drew in Experiment 3
The four sorts
of conditional
The four sorts of inference
Modus ponens
Affirmation of the
consequent Modus tollens
Denial of the
antecedent
Core 98 30 96 32
Enabling 76 96 72 96
Biconditional 96 96 89 93
Relevance 90 19 12 3
Note: Predicted conclusions shown in bold.
1728 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2010, 63 (9)
QUELHAS, JOHNSON-LAIRD, JUHOS
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Jo
hn
so
n-
La
ir
d,
 P
. 
N.
] 
At
: 
20
:0
9 
16
 S
ep
te
mb
er
 2
01
0
In this case, the participants should infer that
Mauro’s studying occurred before his performance
on the exams, which in turn preceded Tania’s gift
of the scooter. Such inferences show that modu-
lation is not just an effect of the order of clauses
in a conditional, but depends on knowledge
about the temporal sequence of events in the
world. This knowledge is embodied in mental
models of the pairs of premises, and so reasoners
can infer the temporal sequence implied by the
two conditionals. Such a phenomenon would
show that conditionals cannot be interpreted in a
truth functional way.
In an initial study, we counterbalanced the
grammatical format of the conditional sentences.
On half the trials the conditionals were in the stan-
dard format illustrated in the examples above, and
on half the trials the conditionals were presented
with their main clauses first—for example:
“Laura infected Renato, if she got the virus”. As
predicted, the counterbalancing had no reliable
effect on performance: The predicted temporal
inferences occurred on 85% of trials using the stan-
dard format and on 82% of trials using the format
with the main clause first. However, one difficulty
with this method of counterbalancing the order of
mention is that some sentences in Portuguese
become slightly artificial. Hence, we used a differ-
ent method in the present experiment.
Method
Design
The participants acted as their own controls and
responded to temporally forwards and backwards
problems, each based on a pair of conditionals.
In the forwards problems, the antecedent of each
conditional referred to the first event of the two,
and the consequent referred to the second event
of the two. In the backwards problems, the antece-
dent of each conditional referred to the second
event of the two, and the consequent referred to
the first event of the two. To prevent the partici-
pants from paying attention only to the antecedent
of the first conditional and the consequent of the
second conditional, half of both the forwards and
backwards problems were presented in this
“figure”:
If A then B.
If B then C.
A.
and half of them were presented in this figure:
If B then C.
If A then B.
A.
Four sorts of question were paired with the pre-
mises on different trials
Did A happen before C?
Did A happen after C?
Did C happen before A?
Did C happen after A?
Every participant encountered four instances of
each sort of question (two for the forwards pro-
blems and two for the backwards problems), and
the questions were matched to the premises so
that half of the predicted responses were “yes”,
and half of the predicted responses were “no”.
Each participant carried out an equal number of
forwards and backwards problems in both orders
of premises with the four sorts of question.
Participants
A total of 64 first-year psychology students (49
woman, 15 men) from ISPA in Lisbon partici-
pated in the experiment for course credit.
Materials
We devised 16 pairs of related conditionals in the
grammatical form: If A then B. If B then C. Each
pair referred to two individuals (one female and
one male), and the meaning of their clauses and
general knowledge implied a temporal order over
three events referred to in the pairs of conditionals
(see Appendix C for the full materials). For 8 of
the pairs, the temporal order was forwards: A, B,
and then C, and for 8 of the pairs the order was
backwards: C, B, and then A.
Procedure
The participants were tested individually using a
computer running the E-Prime program. When
the participants were ready for a trial, they
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pressed the space bar, which presented first the
conditional premises, then the categorical
premise, and finally the question. The participants
answered the question by pressing one of two
colour-coded keys (green–yes; red–no), and the
program recorded their responses and their
latencies.
Results and discussion
Table 7 shows the percentages of predicted
responses to the forwards and backwards pro-
blems. The participants tended overwhelmingly
to make the predicted responses: A total of 59 par-
ticipants made more predicted than unpredicted
responses with forwards problems, 3 participants
had the opposite bias, and 2 were ties (binomial
test, p , .0001); 60 participants made more pre-
dicted than unpredicted responses with backwards
problems, 2 participants had the opposite bias, and
2 were ties (binomial test, p , .0001). There was
no reliable difference in the overall percentages
of predicted responses between forwards and
backwards problems (Wilcoxon test, z ¼ 0.148,
p , .9, two-tailed). However, the participants
made about 8% more predicted “no” responses
then predicted “yes” responses, and the difference
was reliable (Wilcoxon test, z ¼ 2.764, p , .005,
two-tailed). No obvious reason exists for this
difference, though it may be an instance of “nega-
tive conclusion bias” (Evans, 1982). Table 8 shows
the mean latencies for the predicted responses in
milliseconds to the forwards and backwards
problems. The participants were reliably faster
with the forwards inferences (6690 ms) than
with the backwards inferences (7847 ms;
Wilcoxon test, z ¼ 3.297, p , .001, two-tailed).
This result bears out the slightly more natural
interpretation in which the event referred to in
the antecedent occurs before the event referred to
in the consequent. The latencies of the predicted
“yes” responses (7229 ms) and “no” responses
(7367 ms) did not differ reliably (Wilcoxon test,
z ¼ .508, p . .616, two-tailed), but the partici-
pants had a marginal tendency to respond faster
to problems in the figure: If A then B, If B then C
(6827 ms) than in the figure: If B then C, If A
then B (7614 ms; Wilcoxon test, z ¼ 1.806; p ,
.071, two-tailed). Overall, the pattern of inferences
shows that modulation leads to temporal
interpretations, which in turn yield distinct and
predictable patterns of inference.
Table 7. The percentages of predicted responses for the temporally
forwards and backwards problems in Experiment 4
The four sorts of
question
Problems
Temporally
forwards
Temporally
backwards
A before C 69 (yes) 84 (no)
A after C 81 (no) 77 (yes)
C before A 88 (no) 76 (yes)
C after A 80 (yes) 81 (no)
Note: Predicted responses shown in parentheses.
Table 8. The mean latencies of the predicted responses for the temporally forwards and backwards
problems in Experiment 4
The four sorts of question
Problems
Temporally forwards Temporally backwards
M SD M SD
A before C 7336 6038 (yes) 7560 6551 (no)
A after C 6254 3678 (no) 6383 3760 (yes)
C before A 5801 4273 (no) 8146 7223 (yes)
C after A 6934 5003 (yes) 9021 8591 (no)
Note: Predicted responses shown in parentheses.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Consider these two conditionals of the grammati-
cal form, if A then C:
If the dish is kidney beans then its basis is beans.
If the dish is meat then it can be Portuguese stew.
At first sight, they seem similar, and few readers
are likely to notice the subtle difference in their
interpretations of them. Yet, the results of our
experiments corroborated a theory in which the
meanings of their constituent clauses, and
general knowledge, modulate their interpretation
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). Individuals in
Experiment 1 constructed different possibilities
for these two sorts of conditional. For the first
sort, they tended to construct the possibilities for
a core interpretation of a conditional (see Table 1):
A C (e.g., the dish is kidney beans, and its basis is beans)
not-A C (e.g., the dish isn’t kidney beans, and its basis is
beans)
not-A not-C (e.g., the dish isn’t kidney beans, and its
basis isn’t beans)
However, for the second sort of conditional, they
tended to construct the possibilities for an enabling
interpretation:
A C (e.g., the dish is meat, and it is Portuguese stew)
A not-C (e.g., the dish is meat, and it isn’t Portuguese
stew)
not-A not-C (e.g., the dish isn’t meat, and it isn’t
Portuguese stew)
Hence, what is impossible for the core interpret-
ation, A and not-C, is possible for the enabling
interpretation, and what is impossible for the
enabling interpretation, not-A and C, is possible
for the core interpretation. Experiment 1 similarly
corroborated analogous differences in the possibi-
lities that individuals constructed for the tautolo-
gical and biconditional interpretations (see
Table 2). The experiment also bore out the
model theory’s general predictions, including the
bias to construct what is possible rather than
what is impossible, which was greater for factual
than for deontic conditionals. Similarly, it
showed that the participants tended to construct
first the possibility corresponding to the one expli-
cit mental model in which both clauses are true.
The four sorts of conditional established in the
first experiment should yield different patterns of
valid inferences (see Table 3). Experiment 2 corro-
borated these patterns in the conclusions that the
participants accepted as correct (see Tables 4 and
5). For example, they tended to accept the follow-
ing modus ponens inference based on a core
interpretation:
If the dish is kidney beans then its basis is beans.
The dish is kidney beans.
Therefore, its basis is beans.
However, they tended to reject modus ponens for
an enabling interpretation:
If the dish is made of meat then it can be Portuguese stew.
The dish is made of meat.
Therefore, it is Portuguese stew.
The conclusion in this case does not contain the
modal auxiliary, “can”, in the consequent of the
conditional, but this factor is not crucial. The par-
ticipants accepted the denial of the antecedent in
which the same sort of discrepancy occurs:
If the dish is made of meat then it can be Portuguese stew.
The dish is not made of meat.
Therefore, it is not Portuguese stew.
However, they tended to reject this inference for a
core interpretation:
If the dish is kidney beans then its basis is beans.
The dish is not kidney beans.
Therefore, its basis is not beans.
Similarly predictable effects occurred with the
other two conditional inferences (modus tollens
and denial of the antecedent, see Table 4).
The results of Experiment 2 corroborated ana-
logous differences for inferences from the bicondi-
tional and tautological interpretations. A
biconditional interpretation for, say, “if the
animal is a chicken then the female is a hen”,
refers to two possibilities (A and C, and not-A
and not-C), and so, as these possibilities predict,
the participants tended to accept all four sorts of
conditional inference (see Table 4). A tautological
interpretation for a conditional, such as, “if the
dessert is made of chocolate then it can be a
pudding”, refers to all four possibilities, and so,
as these possibilities predict, the participants
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tended not to accept any of the four sorts of con-
ditional inference (see Table 4). Experiment 2
also showed a remarkably similar pattern for
the four sorts of conditionals with deontic
contents, concerning matters of permissibility
(see Table 5).
To envisage two or three possibilities takes time,
and so what happens when individuals are short of
time? According to the theory, by default they
should tend to reject a putative conclusion.
However, they should have time to accept valid
affirmative inferences of modus ponens and affir-
mation of the consequent, which depend on possi-
bilities represented in mental models, whereas they
should be less inclined to accept valid negative
inferences of modus tollens and denial of the ante-
cedent, which depend on possibilities that are not
represented in mental models. One way in which
these inferences can be drawn is to flesh out
mental models into fully explicit models of all the
possibilities to which the conditionals refer
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). A caveat is that
individuals tend to represent what is forbidden in
the case of deontic assertions, and so the difference
between affirmative and negative inferences should
be less pronounced for deontic conditionals.
Experiment 2 corroborated all these effects of
time pressure. Experiment 3 added a further corro-
boration of the theory. The participants had to for-
mulate conclusions for themselves rather than
merely to evaluate given conclusions. The patterns
of their inferences corresponded to the predicted
interpretations for four sorts of conditional, includ-
ing those with the relevance interpretation from
which they tended to make only the modus
ponens inference (see Table 6).
Modulation can add information to the models
of conditionals, and Experiment 4 showed that
individuals make predictable inferences about the
temporal order of events referred to in pairs of con-
ditionals. Given a conditional, such as:
If Carla printed the report, then the toner ran out.
modulation yields the interpretation that the
printing occurred before, and indeed brought
about, the event of the toner running out.
However, given a conditional, such as:
If Jessica visited Lisbon, then Leonel invited her.
modulation yields the interpretation that Jessica’s
visit occurred after, and indeed was occasioned
by, Leonel’s invitation. The problems had pairs
of such conditionals with an event in common,
and the results showed that the participants
inferred the predicted forwards or backwards tem-
poral sequences of three events from them.
At first glance, an alternative explanation of the
phenomena might be that the participants based
their conclusions on the believability of con-
clusions. This account, however, fails to explain
the results of our experiments. Consider these con-
clusions from our earlier illustrative examples:
Its basis is beans.
It is Portuguese stew.
Nothing in these two assertions signals how they
should be evaluated: They seem equally likely,
equally believable, equally acceptable. Yet, the par-
ticipants tended to accept the modus ponens infer-
ence yielding the first conclusion, but to reject it
for the second conclusion. In general, the pre-
dicted effects of modulation on the inferences in
Experiments 2 seem inexplicable on the basis of
any properties of the conclusions alone. The par-
ticipants were instead considering whether or not
the conclusions followed from the premises. The
same argument applies a fortiori to Experiment
3, because in this study the participants drew
their own conclusions. Likewise, the use of two
conditional premises in Experiment 4 insulated
responses from beliefs. For example, they not
provide the answer to questions, such as:
Did Rodrigo send the email after he hired another
secretary?
The model theory predicts that meaning, refer-
ence, and knowledge can all modulate the
interpretation of conditionals. We have modelled
the process computationally using fully explicit
models to represent knowledge in long-term
memory (see Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002,
p. 659). In our earlier description of alternatives
to the model theory, we outlined theories based
on formal rules of inference (e.g., Rips, 1994), on
necessary and sufficient conditions (e.g.,
Thompson, 2000), on suppositions (e.g., Evans
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& Over, 2004), and on probabilities (e.g.,
Oaksford & Chater, 2001). They are all consistent
with the effects of modulation. However, they
have little to say about how individuals carry out
the task of constructing cases of what is possible
or impossible according to assertions. Indeed,
theories often take as given the underlying
logical forms of assertions and then apply formal
rules of inference to them (e.g., Rips, 1994).
Granted the recovery of logical form, formal
rules could probably account for the most of the
inferences in our experiments, though they may
fail to explain those in which a modal auxiliary in
the consequent of a conditional yields a categorical
conclusion—for example, the denial of the
antecedent with an enabling interpretation.
Likewise, it is unclear how to specify the logical
form of the conditionals in Experiment 4, or
the temporal logic required for the inferences
from them.
The key issue for many theories is the recovery
of logical form. Unlike logic, the syntax of sen-
tences in natural language cannot yield their
logical form. It can be determined only from
their meanings in context, which depend in part
on modulation, and even perhaps from the par-
ticulars of the reasoning task (Stenning & Van
Lambalgen, 2008). These latter authors argue
rightly that the recovery of logical form is itself
dependent on reasoning. No algorithm exists for
carrying out the process, and no decisive evidence
exists that human reasoning depends on logical
form. It could be superfluous. The meaning of a
conditional refers to a set of possibilities,
amongst which temporal and other relations may
hold. Once the system has constructed models of
these possibilities, the models themselves can be
used for reasoning (see, e.g., Goodwin &
Johnson-Laird, 2008). An analogous argument
can be made about those theories that postulate
probabilistic interpretations of conditionals (e.g.,
Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2005): To assess the conditional
probability of the consequent of a conditional
given its antecedent, the first step must be to rep-
resent the possibilities to which they refer.
However, as yet, the circumstances are unknown
in which these possibilities must be supplemented
with probabilities in order to understand a con-
ditional. Perhaps Aristotle (Rhetoric, Book I,
1357a27, Barnes, 1984) had the right answer:
only when probabilities are explicitly referred to
in the conditional or its context.
Necessary and sufficient conditions can account
for four interpretations of conditionals: A is suffi-
cient for C yields the core interpretation, A is
necessary for C yields the enabling interpretation,
A is both necessary and sufficient for C yields the
biconditional interpretation, and A is neither
necessary nor sufficient for C yields the tautologi-
cal interpretation (see Table 1). But other
interpretations are feasible, such as the relevance
interpretation of our earlier example, “if they
played a game then it wasn’t soccer”. Necessary
and sufficient conditions likewise provide no
account of the temporal, spatial, and other
relations, to which certain conditionals refer.
Evidence that the representation of possibilities
preserves temporal order comes from priming
studies (e.g. Santamari´a & Espino, 2002, and see
also Byrne, 2005, p. 163). Similarly, individuals
can reason from temporal premises, such as,
“John takes a shower before he drinks coffee”
(Schaeken et al., 1996). However, in Experiment
4, no temporal relations were stated explicitly:
They resulted from modulation, and the partici-
pants inferred the predicted temporal relations
both for forwards conditionals in which the ante-
cedent events occur before the consequent events
and for backwards conditionals in which the ante-
cedent events occur after the consequent events.
Temporal interpretations are a decisive objec-
tion to the view that conditionals can be inter-
preted in a truth functional way, sensitive only to
the truth or falsity of the antecedent and conse-
quent clauses. Both clauses could be true, and yet
the conditional would be false if the two events
occurred in the wrong temporal order. The
model theory is therefore not truth functional—
despite claims to the contrary—because the
theory postulates, first, that the machinery of
understanding normally depends on a represen-
tation of possibilities rather than of truth values
and, second, that modulation can introduce tem-
poral and other sorts of relation.
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In conclusion, our results bear out the view that
the complexity of conditionals is a result of the
interaction among several simple components.
One component yields the core and tautological
interpretations, and other components use
meaning, reference, and knowledge to modulate
this interpretation. One effect of modulation, as
we have shown, is to block the construction of
possibilities and thereby to yield a variety of
interpretations both for factual and for deontic
conditionals. This modulation in turn has predict-
able consequences for the inferences that individuals
draw from conditionals. The inferences that they
deem to be valid depend on the possibilities to
which the premises refer. As these possibilities
change from one sort of conditional to another so,
too, does the pattern of inferences that logically
untrained individuals make. Another effect of
modulation is to add information, such as a temporal
relation, to the models of the antecedent and conse-
quent events. No theory of conditionals that fails to
account for these phenomena can be complete.
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APPENDIX A
The materials for Experiment 1 and 2 (from
the Portuguese)
FACTUAL SENTENCES
Core interpretation
If the dish is kidney beans then its basis is beans.
If the dish is lasagne then its basis is pasta.
If the dish is cabbage soup then its basis is cabbage.
If the dish is sweet yellow pastry then it is made of
yolk.
Biconditional interpretation
If the animal is a chicken then the female is a hen.
If the animal is a lion then the female is a lioness.
If the animal is a dog then the female is a bitch.
If the animal is a duck then the female is a female
duck.
Enabling interpretation
If the dish is made of meat then it can be
Portuguese stew.
If the dish is made of codfish then it can be codfish
“Braz” style.
If the dish is made of spinach then it can be
spinach stew.
If the cake is made of eggs then it can be “suspiro”.
Tautological interpretation
If the dessert is made of chocolate then it can be a
pudding.
If the dessert is made of walnuts then it can be a
cake.
If the dessert is made of apple then it can be a pie.
If the dessert is made of carrot then it can be a tart.
DEONTIC SENTENCES
Core interpretation
If a person gets his or her driving licence then he or
she must be at least 18 years old.
If a person gets married then he or she must be at
least 18 years old.
If a person is a candidate for parliament then he or
she must be at least 18 years old.
If a person applies to be a member of the police
then he or she must be at least 18 years old.
Biconditional interpretation
If a plumber repairs the pipes then he must be paid.
If a watch-maker repairs the watch then he must
be paid.
If a painter paints the house then he must be paid.
If a private physician examines the patient then he
must be paid.
Enabling interpretation
If a person is at least 18 years old then he or she can
join the Air Force.
If a person is at least 18 years old then he or she can
get a licence to fly an aircraft.
If a person is at least 18 years old then he or she can
get a licence to carry a weapon.
If a person is at least 18 years old then he or she can
join the Navy.
Tautological interpretation
If a person is 48 years old then he or she can get a
truck-driving licence.
If a person is 39 years old then he or she can work.
If a person is 53 years old then he or she can build a
company.
If a person is 44 years old then he or she can get a
motorcycle licence.
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APPENDIX B
The materials for Experiment 3 (from the
Portuguese)
Core interpretation
The mechanic says that:
If the driver steps on the brake, then the car
slows down.
One person says that:
If Teresa breaks an arm, then she has pain.
The doctor says that:
If the patient has malaria, then he has fever.
The cook says that:
If the sweet is egg-soft, then it is made out of
yolks.
Biconditional interpretation
The electrician says that:
If the switch is on, then the light is on.
The doorman says that:
If the key is the right one, then it opens the
door.
The cook’s assistant says that:
If Joa˜o switches on the oven, then the oven
heats up.
The animal’s keeper says that:
If that animal is a lion, then its female is a
lioness.
Enabling interpretation
A supporter says that:
If Sporting reaches the final, then they win
the Championship.
The fishmonger says that:
If the fishermen go out to the sea, then they
catch swordfish.
The patroness says that:
If there is flour in the house, then the female
cook makes bread.
An agent of a musician says to his client:
If you have your telephone on, then it is
going to ring.
Relevance interpretation with affirmative
consequent
A friend says that:
If Ricardo wants to go to Rossio, then there
is there a metro stop.
A person says that:
If Tiago wants to visit Jero´nimos, then the
Monastery is in Bele´m.
Marta says that:
If Eva wants to watch the series “Morangos
com Ac¸ucar”, then it is on TVI.
A colleague says that:
If Paulo wants to swim, then the Jamor
Complex has a swimming pool.
Relevance interpretation with negative
consequent
The Grandmother says that:
If Maria goes to the restaurant, then she
doesn’t go to an Indian restaurant.
The Father says that:
If Joa˜o goes travelling, then he doesn’t go by
aeroplane.
A friend says that:
If Ana drinks a juice, than she doesn’t drink
an orange juice.
A colleague says that:
If Manuel plays a game, then he doesn’t play
football.
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APPENDIX C
The materials for Experiment 4 (from the
Portuguese)
The forwards problems
1. If Laura got the virus, then she infected
Renato.
If she infected Renato, then he went to the
hospital.
Laura got the virus.
2. If Ana received the job, then Paulo congratu-
lated her.
If Paulo congratulated her, then she bought
him a gift.
Ana received the job.
3. If Lisa received the money, then she paid
Frederico.
If she paid Frederico, then he bought a new
laptop.
Lisa received the money.
4. If Luisa bought the tickets, then she called
Daniel.
If she called Daniel, then he took care of the
kids.
Luisa bought the tickets.
5. If Ineˆs went to the conference, then she
heard David’s talk.
If she heard David’s talk, then she got
inspired.
Ineˆs went to the conference.
6. If Sandra kissed Edgar, then he got embar-
rassed.
If Edgar got embarrassed, then he blushed.
Sandra kissed Edgar.
7. If Carla printed the report, then the toner
ran out.
If the toner ran out, then Carla asked
Cristiano to change it.
Carla printed the report.
8. If Rodrigo read the email, then he fired
Catarina.
If he fired Catarina, then he hired another
secretary.
Rodrigo read the email.
The backwards problems
9. If Taˆnia gave Mauro a scooter, then he did
well on the exams.
If he did well on the exams, then he studied
a lot.
Taˆnia gave Mauro a scooter.
10. If Filipa uploaded the photo, then Oscar
emailed it to her.
If Oscar emailed the photo to her, then he
sat down at the computer.
Filipa uploaded the photo.
11. If Cristina wrote the article, then Marco
asked her to write it.
If Marco asked her to write it, then he met
her at the meeting.
Cristina wrote the article.
12. If Rosa read the book, then Sandro rec-
ommended it.
If Sandro recommended it, then he saw it at
FNAC.
Rosa read the book.
13. If Rute cooked the lasagna, then Tiago gave
her the recipe.
If Tiago gave her the recipe, then he found it
in a magazine.
Rute cooked the lasagna.
14. If Jessica visited Lisbon, then Leonel invited
her.
If Leonel invited her, then he knew her in
Porto.
Jessica visited Lisbon.
15. If Clotilde bought the toy, then Rui asked
for it.
If Rui asked for the toy, then he saw it on
TV.
Clotilde bought the toy.
16. If Joana left, then Ricardo called a cab for her.
If Ricardo called a cab for her, then he turned
his cell phone on.
Joana left.
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